Abstract. The concept of designated confirmer signatures was introduced by Chaum [Cha94] to improve a shortcoming of undeniable signa tures. The present paper formalizes the definition of designated confirmer signatures and proves that a designated confirmer signature scheme is equivalent to a public-key encryption scheme with respect to existence. In addition, the paper proposes practical designated confirmer signature schemes which are more efficient in signing than the previous scheme [Cha94].
Introduction
The concept of undeniable signatures was proposed by Chaum et al. [ChaSO, CA89] ; the recipient of a signature cannot misuse the signature and the signer cannot subsequently deny the signature. Unfortunately, for many practical applications undeniable signatures have one major shortcoming compared t o normal (self-authenticating) digital signatures. Since undeniable signatures rely on the signer cooperating in subsequent confirmations of the signature, if the signer should become unavailable, such as might be expected in the case of a default on the agreement authorized by the signature, or should refuse to cooperate, then the recipient cannot make use of the signature.
The concept of designated confirmer signatures was introduced by Chaum
[Cha94] t o solve this weakness of undeniable signatures. It involves three parties:
the signer, recipient, and confirmer. In designated confirmer signature schemes, if the signer is unavailable to confirm the signature, the confirmer, previously designated by the signer, can confirm the signature for the recipient.
In [Cha94] , however, no formal definition (i.e., no rigorous concept) of designated confirmer signatures was given, and only an example of designated confirmer signature based on the RSA scheme was proposed. As mentioned in [Cha94] , the remaining problems were as follows:
-give a formal definition (i.e., rigorous concept) of designated confirmer signatures. -construct a designated confirmer signature based on a more general assumption. (i.e., find a sufficient assumption which is as weak as possible.)
-clarify what assumption is essential for constructing a designated confirmer signature. (i.e., find a necessary assumption which is as strong as possible.) -propose more efficient constructions than [Cha94] .
The present paper solves all these problems.
-This paper gives the first formal definition (i.e., rigorous concept) of designated confirmer signatures. -This paper ultimately answers both the questions on necessary and sufficient assumptions. It proves that designated confirmer signatures exast zf and only if public-key encryption [GM84] exists. That is, it shows that the existence of public-key encryption is the necessary and sufficient assumption for constructing designated confirmer signatures. -This paper proposes practical designated confirmer signature schemes that are more efficient in signing than the previous scheme [Cha94] . The proposed schemes are based on three move identification protocols, while the previous scheme is based on the RSA scheme. Two typical constructions are shown, one of which iitilizes the Schnorr scheme [SchSl] as a three move protocol, while the other uses instead the extended Fiat-Shamir scheme [GQ88, OhOk881 as a three move protocol.
The theoretical part of our results can be considered from the following viewpoint. In the theoretical research fields of cryptography, the relationships of (computational) cryptographic primitives have been investigated extensively for the latest ten years and many typical cryptographic primitives have been classified into two classes: one-way function family (OWF) and encryption-decryption function family (EDF). OWF consists of the primitives that are equivalent to one-way functions with respect to existence. EDF consists of the primitives that seem t o require the encryption-decryption property as well as the one-way property. Impagliazzo and Rudich's result [IR89] s e e m t o imply that several primitives such as secret key agreement may essentially require the encryptiondecryption property in addition to the one-way property. In other words, EDF seems to be exclusive to OWF. OWF includes digital signatures [NY89, RomSO], pseudo-random generators [ILL89, Hasgo] , and bit-commit,ment, [NaoSO] . EDF includes secret key agreement, public-key encryption, and oblivious transfer. (Here note that the security of these primitives have been formally defined, and that, for example, a digital signature scheme means a digital signature scheme which is existentially secure against adaptive chosen message attacks [GMRi88] .)
The following natural question is suggested: To which class, OWF or EDF, do undeniable signatures and designated confirmer signatures belong? Boyar et a1 [BCDPSO] gave an answer to this question: undeniable signatures exist if and only if digital signatures exists (i.e., if and only if one-way functions exist [NY89, FbmSO]). That is, undeniable signatures belong to OWF. Hence, the other remaining problem has been to determine to which class, OWF or EDF, designated confirmer signatures belong.
The present paper answers this problem. It shows that designated confirmer signatures belong to EDF. This result seems to be somewhat surprising since designated confirmer signatures belong to a class different from the class of undeniable signatures, although designated confirmer signatures were introduced as a variant of undeniable signatures. (On the contrary, the previous rcsult that undeniable signatures belong t o the same class as digital signatures belong t o The relationships of physical (i.e., information theoretical, or unconditionally secure) cryptographic primitives have been also investigated (e.g., [Oka93]).
[BCDPSO] is less surprising, since undeniable signatures were introduced as a variant of digital signatures.) This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 formalizes designated confirmer signatures and proves the main theorem that implies the equivalence of the designated confirmer signatures and public-key encryption. Section 3 proposes practical designated confirmer signature schemes that are more efficient in signing than the previous scheme.
Theoretical Results

Definitions
In this section, we formally define the "designated confirmer signature", as a variant of the definition of the "undeniable signature" by [BCDPSO] . In the definition of designated confirmer signatures, a "designated confirmer" is introduced in addition t o the properties of the undeniable signatures. Definition 1. [Secure designated confirmer signature scheme] A secure "designated confirmer signature" scheme is (Gs, Gc, Sign, Conf(s,v) , Conf(c,v) ) such that the following conditions hold:
1. K e y generation (Gs, Gc):
Let S be a signer, and C be a designated confirmer. G c is a probabilistic poly-time algorithm which, on input 1" (the security parameter), outputs a pair of strings, (C's secret-key, C's public-key), which is denoted by Gc(1") = (Glc(l"), G2c(l")). G s is a probabilistic poly-time algorithm which, on input strings 1" and C's public-key E G2c(ln), outputs a pair of strings, (S's secret-key, S'S public-key), which is denoted by G s ( l n , G2c(ln)) = (Gls(l", G2c(ln)), G2s(ln), G2c(ln)). Hereafter, however, for simplicity, G s ( l n , G2c(l")) = (Gls(l", G2c(l")), G2s(1"),G2c(ln)) will be just written by Gs(1") = (Gls(l"), G2s(1")). The probability is taken over Gc's and Gs's coin tosses. Note that, as a variant, the input of Gs can be restricted only to 1". (Then, a slight modification of the definitions of the signing and privacy is required in some cases, although it is fairly easy. See Note of this definition.)
Sign is a probabilistic poly-time algorithm which, on input strings l", m (message), C's public-key E G2c(l"), and S's (secret-key, public-key) E Gs(ln), outputs a string ("designated confirmer signature"), which is denoted by Sign( In, m , Gs( 1")) (shorlly by Sign(rn) ). The probability is taken over Sign's coin tosses. Let Xs(m) be the set of Sign(rn).
C~n f (~,~)
is an interactive proof [GMRa89] between S and V , which, on common input strings I", m , s (the presumed signature of m), S's publickey € G2s(l"), and C's public-key € G2c(ln), outputs either 0 ("true") or 1 ("false"). Here, signer S is the prover with an auxiliary input, S's secretkey E Gls(l"), and V is the verifier. otherwise. The probability is taken over the coin tosses of S and V . C o n f ( c , v ) is an interactive proof between C and V , which, on common input strings l", m, s, S's public-key E GZs(l"), and C's public-key E G2c(l"), outputs either 0 ("true") or 1 ("false"). Here, designated confirmer C is the prover with an auxiliary input, C's secret-key E G l c ( l " ) , and V is the verifier. For all m, for any constant c, and for sufficiently large n ,
and
otherwise. The probability is taken over the coin tosses of C and V .
Security:
-[Seciirity for signers: Unforgeability against any adaptively chosen message attacks] Let F be a probabilistic poly-time forging algorithm which, on input strings l", S's public-key E G2s(l"), C'S public-key E G2p(ln), and C's secret-key E Glc(l"), can request and receive S's signatures of polynomially-many adaptively chosen messages {m,}, can request the execution of C o n f ( s ,~) for polynomially-many adaptively chosen strings (either true signature strings or fake signature strings), and finally outputs a pair of strings (m, s ) . Then, far all such F , for any constant c , for all sufficiently large n , the probability that F outputs ( m , s) for which either Conf (s,v) or Conf(c,v) outputs 0 is less than l/nc. The probability is taken over the coin tosses of G s , G c , Sign, S, V and F .
Let A be a probabilistic poly-time attacking algorithm which, on input strings 1") s's public-key € G25(ln), s's secret-key E G1s(ln), and C's public-key E G2c(ln), can request the execution of Conf(C,A) for polynomially-many strings (either true signature strings ur fake signature strings) adaptively chosen by A , and finally execute C o n f (~, v ) which is accepted by V , where V is a honest verifier.
Then, for all such A , for any constant c, for all sufficiently large n , the probability that A succeeds in the above-mentioned attack is less than l/ne. The probability is taken over the coin tosses of Gs, Gc, C , V and A .
-[Security for confirmers] T(s,v) , T(c,v), m ) denote the output of a distinguisher D when its input is the possible signature s for message rn, and possible transcripts T(s,v) and T(C,v There are three kinds of definitions of a "secure" public-key encryption scheme [GM84], and these three definitions have been proven to be equivalent [MRS88] . Here, we adopt the definition based on the indistinguishability.
. Privacy (Untransferability):
-[
Definition 2. [Secure public-key encryption scheme]
key encryption" scheme is (G, E , D ) such that the following conditions hold:
A secure "public-
Key generation (G):
G is a probabilistic poly-time algorithm which, on input 1" (the security parameter), outputs a pair of strings, (secret-key, public-key), which is denoted by G(1") = (Gl(l"), G2(ln)). The probability is taken over G's coin tosses.
E is a probabilistic poly-time algorithm which, on input strings I", m (plaintext), public-key € G2(1"), outputs a string ("ciphertext") c , which is denoted by EGqIm)(m). The probability is taken over E's coin tosses.
Encryption ( E ) :
D is a probabilistic poly-time algorithm which, on input strings 1" , cipher-
(secret-key, public-key) € Gs(ln), outputs a string, which is denoted by DG(ln)(C), For any rn, for any constant c, and for sufficiently large n ,
The probability is taken over D's coin tosses.
A public-key encryption scheme (GI E , 0 ) is secure if for any polynomial sequence of random variables X,, = (X, (1) ,Xn (2) ), for any polynomial time machine A , for any constant c and for any sufficiently large n 4. Security:
Pr(Xn = (m0, ml)) ' (1 Pr (A((m0, m l ) , EG(ln)(mO)) = 1)
The probability is taken ovcr XP) and Xi2)% distributions and coin losses of A , G and E . First, we assume the existence of a secure public-key encryption scheme.
Encryption
Let E,,(rn) be a secure public-key encryption of a plaintext m for receiver C ( e c is C's public-key), where only C can decipher m by m = Ddc(Eec(m))
Then, an ordinary signature scheme which is existentially secure against adaptive chosen message attacks [GMRi88] (hereafter, we will call this signature scheme simply the "secure" signature scheme) exists, since a secure signature scheme exists if and only if a one-way function exists [NY89, ROm90], and a oneway function exists if a secure public-key encryption scheme exists (use the key generation function of the public-key encryption scheme to construct a one-way function).
Let u s ( m ) be the set of ordinary secure signatures of m generated by signer S, and Vs(m,s) be a verification boolean function for S's signature, where V,(rn,s) = 0 iff s E cs(m) and Vs(m,s) = 1 iff s $ us(rn).
We will now explain a designated confirmer protocol based on a secure publickey encryption scheme and ordinary secure signature scheme. Let S be a signer, C be a confirmer, and V be a verifier. The designated confirmer protocol consists of the signing protocol by S, confirmation protocol between S and V , confirmation protocol between C and V .
First the key generation and signing protocol between S and V is as follows:
Protocol: (Key generation and signing: designated confirmer signature)
Step -there exists (s', K c , r ) such that PS,C = E,,(Kc), Z = BC(s', h~,(m)) and Vs(m,s') = 1.
Step 3 When S proves that Z The confirmation and disavowal protocol between C and V is as follows:
Protocol: (Confirmation and disavowal between C and V : desig-
Step 1 C calculates li'c = Da, (Ps,c Step 2 When C proves the validity of 2 = Sign(m) E Zs(m), C proves to V that there exists (s,lic,t) satisfying Vs(rn,s) = 0, Sign(m) =
B C ( s , h~~( r n ) ) ,
and G t ( l n ) = ( e C , d c ) , li'c = Dd, (Ps,c) , with a zero-knowledge interactive proof [BCC88, IY87, GMW861, where t is a random string for key generation algorithm G t o generate keys
Step 3 When C proves that 2 @ Cs(m> is an invalid signature of m , C proves to V either one of the followings wilh a zero-knowledge interactive proof [BCC88, IY87, GMW861:
-there exists (Kc , t ) such that Gt (1") = ( e c , d c ) , Kc = Ddc ( P s ,~) , and the BC opening of 2 with h~, ( r n ) is unsuccessful.
-there exists (s',lic,t) such that G t ( l " ) = (ec,dc), K c = Ddc(Ps,c), 2 = B C ( s ' , h~~( m ) ) and Vs(m,s') = 1.
(ec, d c ) .
Now, we show that the above-mentioned scheme satisfies the conditions for a secure designated confirmer signature scheme. We assume the existence of a secure designated confirmer signature scheme. Then, the public-key encryption scheme can be constructed using the designated confirmer signature scheme as follows:
Protocol: (Public-key encryption)
Step 1 Key generation: The public-key of the designated confirmer in the underlying designakd confirmer signature scheme is used for the public-key, e , of the encryption scheme. The corresponding secret-key of the confirmer is used for the secret-key, d , of the encryption scheme. Suppose a plaintext, b, is one bit (0 or 1). An arbitrary message m is selected, and the other necessary parameters (signer's secret and public keys) for a signer in the underlying designated confirmer signature scheme is generated.
of m along with the generated signer's parameters.
is a fake signature F a k e ( m ) 4 Es(m), which is generated by the signature simulator Simulator, along with the signer's parameters. Here, note that Fake(m) Cs(rn) can be checked by signer's confirmation protocol. Here, the public-key of the designated confirmer is used as
Step 2 Encryption:
Step 3 
Note:
If the length of the plaintext is k bits, repeat the above procedure of encryption and decryption k times. (Note that the parameters of the signer can be shared.) Now, we show that the above-mentioned scheme satisfies the conditions for a secure public-key encryption sc,heme.
First, from the property of the confirmahion protocol of the designated confirmer, Dd(Ee(b)) = b with overwhelming probability.
Next, we show that the above-ment,ioned public-key encryption scheme is secure. For simplicity of description, here we assume that a ciphertext is one bit. Then, E,(O) (= Sign(m) E Zs(rn), m , public parameters) and Ee(l) (= 
Protocol:
Step 1 C (or S ) sends li'c to V.
Step 2 V calculates s by opening the bit commitment Sign(m) = B C ( S , hKc(rn)) through h~, ( r n ) , and checks whether Vs(rn,s) = 0 holds. GQ88, OhOk88] are based on the factoring problem. This section first gives general description which is common among these constructions is given. Next, two examples are given: one is based on the Schnorr scheme, and the other is based on the extended Fiat-Shamir scheme.
The advantage of the proposed schemes based on the discrete logarithm type protocols [Schgl, Oka921 compared to the Chaum scheme [Cha94] is:
-If the preprocessing technique is used in the signing stage, the time taken for signing is much shorter than with the Chaum scheme. That is, in the Chaum scheme, the running time for signing is at least as same as that for the RSA scheme (i.e., very slow), while, in the proposed scheme, the running time for signing after the preprocessing is negligible.
-The security of this construction depends on only one arithmetical problem, i.e., the discrete logarithm problem, while the Chaum scheme depends on two arithmetical problems, i.e., the discrete logarithm problem and factoring problem (if either one is breakable, the scheme is breakable, although our scheme is breakable only if the discrete logarithm problem is tractable).
Apart from this security advantage, our scheme has some practical merits. One is that all required arithmetical procedures can be executed using the same modulus p and q. Another is that an elliptic curve variant can be constructed, which has practical merits such as shorter data size and less computational complexity. Protocol: (Signing and confirmation between S and V )
Step 1 S generates a designated confirmer signature ( d , e , y ) The confirmation protocol between C and V is as follows:
Protocol: (Confirmation between C and V )
Step 1 C receives (rn,(d,e,y) ) from S or V. C and V calculate z = e 6+ H (m, D ( e , y , a ) ) .
Step 2 C proves to V that logy b = logd I in a zero-knowledge manner (without revealing u ) .
The conversion protocol between C and V is as follows:
Protocol: (Conversion by C )
Step 1 C calculates z = e @ H ( m , D ( e , y , a ) ) .
C proves to V that log, b = log, z C sends ([I, l 2 , k) to V as follows:
Step 2 V checks whether S proves to V that logg d = logb z in a zero-knowledge manner (without revealing .
) by using [ChaSO, BCDPSO] .
The confirmation protocol between C and V and the conversion protocol between C and V can be shown similarly.
3.3
Here, the extended Fiat-Shamir identification protocol [GQ88, OhOk881 is used as (A, 0 ) such that first S (prover) sends message z = wL mod n (= A l ( w ) ) to D (verfier), D sends e E Zr. to S, S sends y = wse mod n (= Az(w,e,s))
to V , and finally D checks the validity of (z, e , y) by checking z = y L a e mod n (= D(e, y,a) ). Here w E R Z,, Q = l/sL mod n , and n = PQ (PI Q: primes). S's public key, s: S's secret key).
Example Based on the Extended Fiat-Shamir
Let b = gu mod p be confirmer C's public key and u be C's secret key.
First the signing protocol between S and V is as follows:
Protocol: (Signing and confirmation between S and V )
Step 1 S generates a designated confirmer signature (d, e, y) of a message m such that d = g' mod p , e = (b' mod p ) @ H ( m , x ) , x = w L mod n , y = wse mod n. Here, I' E R Z,, w E R 2,. S sends ( m , (d, e l y) ) to V .
Step 2 S and V calculate z = e @ H ( m , yLae mod n ) .
S proves t o V that logg d = logb z in a zero-knowledge manner (without revealing r ) by using [ChaSO, BCDPSO] .
Conclusion
This paper has formalized the definition of designated confirmer signatures and has proven that a designated confirmer signature scheme is equivalent to a publickey encryption scheme with respect to existence. This paper also presented practical designated confirmer signature schemes which are more efficient in signing than the previous scheme.
